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INTELLECTUAL EMOTIONS AND  
RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS
Peter Goldie
What is the best model of emotion if we are to reach a good understanding 
of the role of emotion in religious life? I begin by setting out a simple model 
of emotion, based on a paradigm emotional experience of fear of an immedi-
ate threat in one’s environment. I argue that the simple model neglects many 
of the complexities of our emotional lives, including in particular the com-
plexities that one finds with the intellectual emotions. I then discuss how our 
dispositions to have these kinds of emotions, which are part of what it is to 
be a virtuous intellectual enquirer, are subject to vicissitudes, in particular 
brought about by depression, apathy and other damaging changes to our 
psychic economy. These changes can flatten affect, so that one’s intellectual 
life goes cold on one. Finally, I commend the idea of applying this model of 
intellectual emotion onto religious emotion.
A Simple Model of Emotion
There is a model of emotion to be found in the current debate on the emo-
tions, both in philosophy and in the interdisciplinary activity of cognitive 
science, in which philosophy plays its part. According to this model, the 
emotions are quite simple phenomena. In support of the model, we are 
often given an example—a paradigm. Here is one such. We see a bear 
approaching us in the woods, and we react with fear. This fearful reac-
tion involves certain visceral changes and changes to the autonomic ner-
vous system (in this case increased heart rate, increased adrenalin flow 
and so on), which changes are felt. This is just what emotional feelings 
are—bodily feelings. The fearful reaction also involves certain action ten-
dencies (in this case the tendency to escape from the threat, by running 
or hiding perhaps).1 Something like this model is often attributed to the 
work of William James, and there certainly is some truth in the idea. Ac-
cording to James, emotions—or to be precise what he called the ‘standard 
emotions’—are just the feeling of certain bodily changes which “follow di-
rectly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact”; “our feelings of the changes 
1For discussion of action tendencies, see Nico J. Fridja, The Laws of Emotion (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Ass., 2007).
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as they occur is the emotion.”2 Anyway, perhaps we can safely call the 
model Jamesian, bearing in mind that it continues to be advocated today in 
one form or another by people who call their accounts Jamesian.3
On this simple—Jamesian—model, the emotions have certain important 
characteristics. First, they are short-term reactions to events in our imme-
diate environment, or to what is sometimes called an ‘eliciting event’—the 
approaching bear in this case.4 Secondly, these reactions are selectionally 
advantageous to us; they are adaptive.5 On our example, the fearful re-
sponses to the approaching bear, including the bodily changes and action 
tendencies, increase our chances of survival and thus of being able to pass 
on our genes, always on the assumption that the environment in which 
we now live shares relevant properties with the environment in which the 
emotions evolved—the so-called environment of evolutionary adapted-
ness. Thirdly, the emotions on this model are universal, or at least pan-cul-
tural amongst humans, with pan-cultural facial expression, and are shared 
with, or homologous to, emotions in other animals.6 Fourthly, the emotions 
do not need to involve reasoning through higher-level cognitive processes; 
indeed, the very immediacy of the response to the bear is evidence for this, 
and for the fact that the immediate non-cognitive response is more adap-
tive than slower cognitive processing; it is what is called fast and frugal or 
quick and dirty.7 And fifthly, because the emotions on this model are quite 
simple phenomena, involving measurable bodily changes, they are opera-
tionalisable: one can conduct empirical studies in psychology, biology and 
neuroscience to throw light on what processes are involved.
I am sympathetic to much in this model of emotion. But my sympathy 
comes with two very substantial qualifications. The first qualification is 
2William James, “What is an Emotion?” Mind 9 (1884): 188–205, at 189–190. 
3See, for example, Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain 
(New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994); Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion 
and its Role in Literature, Music and Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
4For this kind of view, see Klaus Scherer, “Emotions in Everyday Life,” Social Science In-
formation 43 (2004): 499–570. 
5For this kind of view, see John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, “The Evolutionary Psychol-
ogy of the Emotions and their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables,” in Handbook 
of Emotions, ed. M. Lewis, J. Haviland-Jones, and L. Feldman Barrett (New York: Guildford 
Press, 2008), 114–137.
6For this kind of view, see Paul Ekman, “An Argument for Basic Emotions,” Cognition 
and Emotion 6 (1992): 169–200; Paul Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psy-
chological Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Charles Darwin, The 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, with an introduction, afterword and commentary 
by P. Ekman (London: Harpercollins, 1998). Joseph LeDoux discusses how the amygdala is 
implicated in fear responses in rats and humans in his The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996). 
7Many scholars are particularly struck by the experiments of Robert Zajonc, which pur-
port to show that affect can occur prior to, and without, cognition. See his “On the Primacy 
of Affect,” American Psychologist 39 (1984): 117–123, and “Evidence for Non-Conscious Emo-
tions,” in The Nature of Emotions, ed. P. Ekman and R. Davidson (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 293–297.
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that the model must not claim hegemony; it must not claim that emo-
tions in general have all these features. For if it does, it skews the class of 
emotion towards this particular paradigm. Some emotional experiences, 
including fear of the approaching bear, no doubt do have these features. 
But to insist that all emotions have these features either denies the phe-
nomena, or it redefines emotion in a way that eliminates the rest of our 
emotional life by what is more or less a definitional fiat, in effect insisting 
that what lacks the features outlined above isn’t really an emotion.8
The second qualification is really more of a disagreement. I would con-
tend, although I cannot argue for it here, that not all emotional feelings are 
bodily feelings. Feelings can also be directed towards things in the world 
beyond the bounds of the body—towards the bear for example; these feel-
ings, bound up with thought, are what I have called feelings towards.9
What the Simple Model Neglects
There is much more to our emotional life than is captured by the simple 
Jamesian model, and there is today a considerable reaction against it.10 
Here I want to briefly to discuss three aspects of emotion that the simple 
model neglects, focussing in particular on the second and third. With these 
three aspects in place we have, I suggest, a more complex model of emo-
tion, one that is better placed to capture the role of emotion in religious 
life—better, that is, than the simple model that takes as its paradigm our 
reaction to the approaching bear in the woods.
(i) The life of the Mind
First, then, we humans are capable of having emotions that are directed in 
thought and feeling towards the past and future. We can, for example, feel 
shame at the silly and irresponsible thing we did at that party on the beach 
all those years ago. This shame that we now feel might not be what we 
felt at the time; perhaps then, being younger, we thought our behaviour 
to be rather insouciant and stylish, and only now do we see it as it really 
8See Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are. 
9This is of course not to deny that bodily feelings are a significant aspect of emotional ex-
perience; what is being denied is that bodily feelings are the only feelings which are involved. 
For discussion, see my The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000), and “Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way,” Emotion Review 1 
(2009), special edition on emotional experience, ed. S. Döring and R. Reisenzein, 232–239. 
10See, for example, Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press); John Deigh, “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,” Ethics 104 (1994): 824–854; 
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Robert Roberts, Emotions: An Aid in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert Solomon, The Passions (New York: Doubleday, 
1976); Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Bennett 
Helm, Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001); and my The Emotions. There is not space here to argue for 
the alternative model of emotion that I am putting forward in this paper; the aim, rather, is 
to begin with the assumption that this model is more or less correct, and then to see how it 
might be applied to the religious emotions. 
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was. And in respect of the future, emotions can be involved in our form-
ing intentions and in making plans. We can, for example, consider doing 
something rather reprehensible and feel guilty at the very thought: we 
shrink from the action ‘as an impossibility,’ to use J. S. Mill’s nice expres-
sion.11 So in us humans our emotions are not just concerned with ‘eliciting 
events’ in our immediate environment, but with what I like to call the 
life of the mind.12 Moreover, we can be reflective about our emotions, as-
sessing them as appropriate or inappropriate, and even having emotions 
about the emotions which we have or imagine having.
(ii) The Intellectual (and Aesthetic) Emotions
The second aspect of human emotion that the simple model neglects is that 
emotions can be directed in thought and feelings towards matters of intel-
lectual or aesthetic import, where the characteristic features of the simple 
model are much less readily applicable. I will not be discussing the aes-
thetic emotions here,13 but will focus on the intellectual emotions, although 
I might quickly note that in the neglect of both these kinds of emotion we 
might again see a trace of William James, who thought of intellectual, aes-
thetic and ethical emotions as other than what he called ‘standard.’14
A number of philosophers have recently argued persuasively for the 
existence of intellectual emotions.15 These include emotions such as de-
light, wonder, awe, fascination, courage, surprise, worry, doubt, curios-
ity, concern, tenacity, and hope, some of which are found elsewhere, oth-
er than when directed towards intellectual objects, and some of which 
are more exclusive to intellectual matters. As Michael Stocker in particu-
lar has argued, these emotions have an eminent history in philosophical 
writing, which makes it even more notable that they are neglected today, 
and even more notable that one needs to argue for their existence. More-
over, they have an eminent history in biographies and autobiographies 
of philosophical and scientific enquiry, where we often find accounts 
that refer specifically to the emotions experienced by the philosopher 
or the scientist. The psychologist Theodule Ribot, who was writing just 
after William James, remarked, “The biographies of learned men fur-
nish us with innumerable examples: the perpetual physical sufferings 
11John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. R. Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
chap. 3. 
12See my “The Life of the Mind: Commentary on ‘Emotions in Everyday Life,’” Social Sci-
ence Information 43 (2004): 591–598.
13For discussion, see my “Towards a Virtue Theory of Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics 47 
(2007): 372–387, and “Virtues of Art and Human Well-Being,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society Supp. Vol. LXXXII (2008): 179–195. 
14For a very helpful discussion, see Michael Stocker, “Intellectual and Other Non-Standard 
Emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. P. Goldie (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 401–423. 
15See in particular Stocker, “Intellectual and Other Non-Standard Emotions”; and Adam 
Morton, “Epistemic Emotions,” in P. Goldie, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, 
385–399. 
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of Pascal, Malebranche nearly suffocated by the palpitations of his heart 
when reading Descartes, Humphrey Davy dancing in his laboratory af-
ter having made the discovery of potassium,” and so on.16 Many such 
examples, including Davy’s discovery of potassium, are discussed in 
Richard Holmes’s very nice book The Age of Wonder (2009). Holmes men-
tions there that Coleridge said that science was “necessarily performed 
with the passion of hope”17—a thought with which his friend Davy was 
very much in agreement. A nice example is Isaac Newton, who, in his 
letter to the then Secretary of the Royal Society, reports his first response 
to seeing light shone through a prism: “It was at first a pleasing diver-
tissement to view the vivid and intense colours produced thereby, but 
after a while applying myself to consider them more circumspectly, I 
became surprised to see them in an oblong form; which, according to 
the received laws of refraction, I expected should have been circular. 
. . . Comparing the length of this coloured spectrum with its breadth, I 
found it about five times greater, a disproportion so extravagant that it 
excited me to a more than ordinary curiosity of examining from whence 
it might proceed.”18 In this short paragraph, we can count at least four 
intellectual emotions.
One thought about the intellectual emotions is that their value is mere-
ly as a non-necessary instrumental aid to intellectual enquiry which an 
enquirer could manage perfectly well without, although they might be 
epistemically helpful. Although I can’t argue for it here, I prefer the idea 
that we should think of what it is to have the intellectual virtues (I intend 
no elitist connotations here in the term ‘intellectual’) as being analogous 
to what it is, according to Aristotle, to be an ethically virtuous person.19 
According to this idea, the virtuous intellectual enquirer, like his ethical 
counterpart, will have, as Aristotle put it, the right emotions at the right 
time in the right place and towards the right kinds of object,20 and being 
able to do this is part of what it is to be virtuous. In other words, doing 
the right things is not sufficient for intellectual virtue; without the appro-
priate intellectual emotions, we cannot be a fully virtuous enquirer, and 
emotion is a necessary component of intellectual activity. On this view, 
then, in scientific or philosophical enquiry—what one might think of as 
the paradigm of rational activity—emotion is not just an instrumental aid, 
but essential to the activity itself. And, I believe, just the same is true of the 
16For this citation from Theodore Ribot, see Michael Stocker, “Intellectual and Other Non-
Standard Emotions,” 411. See also Ribot’s Psychology of the Emotions (New York: Scribner’s, 
1897).
17Richard Holmes, The Age of Wonder: How the Romantic Generation Discovered the Beauty 
and Terror of Science (London: Pantheon Books, 2009), 268.
18Cited in Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750 
(New York: Zone Books, 1998), 303. 
19For a recent survey in this area, see Guy Axtell, “Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997:), 1–26.
20Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1099a16–20.
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artistic virtues: having the right emotions is essential here too. Further-
more, given that ethical, intellectual and aesthetic emotions aren’t just an 
added extra but essential to their related activities, and given that engag-
ing in these virtuous activities is constitutive of well-being, it follows that 
one cannot live a good life, a life of virtue, without these emotions.21
Virtues are, of course, a kind of disposition, and therefore, I am suggest-
ing, the ethical, intellectual and aesthetic virtues will include dispositions 
to have the right emotions. And this leads me neatly to the third aspect of 
human emotion that the simple model neglects: emotional dispositions.
(iii) Emotional Dispositions
In discussing this third neglected aspect of emotion, I want to begin by 
recalling an ambiguity in our way of talking of emotion. If I say that I am 
envious of Mary’s successes, I might be referring to the occurrent emo-
tion, to the feeling of envy that I am now experiencing. Or alternatively I 
might be referring to the emotion as a dispositional attitude, an attitude 
that I have towards Mary’s successes. On this latter alternative, then, it can 
truthfully be said of me that I am envious of Mary’s successes without in 
any way implying that I am at this moment feeling envious; I might be 
asleep or thinking of something entirely different.22
We typically use the term ‘emotion’ for both episode and disposition, 
but the simple view focuses only on the episode. And yet our emotional 
dispositions are an integral part of our psychic economy. They make us 
what we are: our love of our children and parents; your hatred of oppres-
sion; his fear of large dogs; her sympathy for the homeless.
It is an important feature of emotional dispositions that they are not 
simply dispositions to have a single kind of emotion. For example, your 
enduring love of your children or parents is not just a disposition to have 
loving feelings towards them when they are in the offing. It can be ex-
pressed in a complex structure of possible responses: delight if they suc-
ceed in their endeavours; anger if you hear them insulted behind their 
backs; fear and concern if you think they might be ill; hope if you think 
that their illness might have a cure; and so on.23 Even my envy of Mary’s 
successes isn’t just a disposition to feel envy; it can be expressed in a feel-
ing of delight when I hear that her latest success looks after all as if it’s 
turning into something of a poisoned chalice; I wouldn’t be feeling this 
delight if I weren’t envious of her.
21According to Aristotle, artistic activity (both in producing and in appreciating art) is not 
part of well-being or eudaimonia; intellectual activity, of course, is; see especially Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book X. For discussion, with reason for disagreeing with Aristotle about the place of 
artistic activity in well-being, see my “Towards a Virtue Theory of Art” and “Virtues of Art 
and Human Well-Being.”
22Emotions as dispositions are central to Richard Wollheim’s account of emotion; see his 
On the Emotions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), and for discussion see my 
“Wollheim on Emotion and Imagination,” Philosophical Studies 127 (2006): 1–17. 
23This kind of structure is at the heart of Bennett Helm’s account in his Emotional Reason. 
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Another important feature of emotional dispositions is their change-
ability—their vicissitudes. Part of this is to be explained by the ways in 
which emotional dispositions interact with experience: an experience can 
change the disposition—by consolidating it, or by attenuating it, or in 
other ways.24 For example, one’s sympathy for the homeless might be per-
manently damaged or even disabled completely as a result of a single ex-
perience of being attacked by a homeless person. Emotional dispositions 
can also be changed as a result of changes in other dispositions elsewhere 
in one’s psychic economy. For example, her disposition to delight in the 
natural beauties of open spaces might disappear altogether as a result of 
an agoraphobia that only arrived as she reached middle age.
There are other possibilities here, however, possibilities that give rise 
to significant epistemic questions in understanding the mind—both one’s 
own mind and the mind of others. For it is possible that certain factors can 
have the effect of blocking off or preventing the response that one would 
otherwise expect from the disposition, whilst the disposition remains in 
place.25 For example, if I am depressed, as a loving father I might not feel 
the delight that I otherwise would when I hear of the success of my son in 
his exams, although I really am still a loving father. If I am overwhelmed 
with troubles of my own, as a fervent campaigner for civil rights I might 
not feel the compassion that I normally would when I hear of the arrest of 
a prisoner of conscience somewhere in the world. In these cases I might 
judge that these events are a good or a bad thing, and much to be celebrat-
ed or bemoaned, but still, I don’t feel as I should, or as I used to feel. The 
expression of the emotional dispositions is blocked, and the judgements 
are no longer emotionally laden as they were.
Earlier I said that, in emotional experience, thought and feeling are 
bound up together, directed together towards the object of the emotion. 
As a corollary to that, I would add that we should resist the idea that 
these judgements are just the same with or without the feeling, so that if 
the feeling later returns, it is simply to be added on to the content of the 
judgement. This is what I call the add-on view; against this, I prefer the 
view that, with feeling bound up into thought, both the content of the 
judgement and the attitude itself are different.26
But the epistemic questions should be clear. In each case we might not 
know whether the disposition has ceased to exist, or whether the disposi-
tion is temporarily blocked from its normal expression. Would she still 
delight in open spaces if her agoraphobia could be cured? Am I no longer 
24For detailed discussion, see Wollheim, On the Emotions. 
25These issues are discussed in Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “Demystifying Sen-
sibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect,” in P. Goldie, The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Emotion, 585–613. 
26For discussion, see my The Emotions, and my “Getting Feelings into Emotional Experi-
ence in the Right Way.” See also Tim Bloser, “The Content of Emotional Thoughts,” Philo-
sophical Papers 36 (2007): 219–243; and Michelle Montague, “The Logic, Intentionality, and 
Phenomenology of Emotion,” Philosophical Studies 145 (2009): 171–192. 
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a loving father, or am I a loving father who is depressed? Is it just tem-
porary compassion fatigue or don’t I really care about political freedom 
any more?
Intellectual Emotion, Virtue, and Varieties of Weakness
Now, let’s connect this discussion of the vicissitudes of emotional disposi-
tions to the earlier discussion of the intellectual emotions and the intel-
lectual virtues. I hope it is immediately obvious that the emotions that are 
appropriate to intellectual activity can be effected just as can my feelings 
about my son’s successes, or her feelings about political freedom. So, if 
being disposed to have the right intellectual emotions is part of what it is 
to be intellectually virtuous, then these vicissitudes can prevent one from 
virtuous intellectual activity.
I dare say that we have all, at one time or another, been susceptible 
to this loss of affect in our intellectual activities, and, if we have, we will 
surely appreciate just how debilitating it can be. We know that this new 
book or paper on just the topic that we are ourselves researching will be 
interesting and challenging, and we know that we ought to read it. But we 
have no curiosity, no wonder at what we read, no feeling of hope that we 
will find some answers, and no courage to keep on reading, to keep on 
asking questions. We no longer feel the keenness to write new material, 
merely going through the motions, driven by mere habit or by the require-
ments of one’s job, churning out more and more variations on the same 
old stuff. Our intellectual life has gone cold on us.
We have names for the variety of causes of such loss of affect: depres-
sion, apathy, lack of resolution, demoralization, a feeling of hopelessness, 
sloth, lassitude, tiredness, and so on; terms which are often simply names 
of a problem, rather than explanations.27 What can you do? In part, the 
answer will depend on prior answers to the epistemic questions I have 
just been posing. If it’s a temporary blocking of the emotional disposition, 
then perhaps you should try to take exercise in the morning before start-
ing work. But if it’s permanent, then perhaps the best thing is not to keep 
on flogging the dead horse, but to give up altogether.
Religious Emotions
I would like to suggest that these ideas about intellectual emotions can 
be brought to bear on the religious emotions—that we have here a good 
model of how religious emotions are properly located in a good religious 
life. Let’s see how things would look if I were right.
First, the right model for religious emotions wouldn’t be the simple 
model, which skews the class of emotion towards what William James 
27Matthew Ratcliffe has a very helpful discussion of loss of hope, one kind of which is de-
moralisation. He notes that the latter has even been identified as a medical condition which 
is distinct from depression. See his “What is it to Lose Hope?” (unpublished paper), and D. 
W. Kissane and D. M. Clarke, “Demoralization Syndrome: A Relevant Psychiatric Diagnosis 
for Palliative Care,” Journal of Palliative Care 17 (2001): 12–21. 
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called the standard emotions. So religious emotions needn’t involve just 
bodily feelings; they needn’t be immediate reactions to eliciting events in 
the environment; they needn’t be selectionally advantageous, pan-cultur-
al, and shared with other animals; they needn’t typically arise without 
cognitive processing; they needn’t be operationalisable.
Secondly, the better model for religious emotion would be the intellec-
tual (and aesthetic) emotions—emotions directed in thought and feeling 
towards the object of the intellectual (or aesthetic) activity. Many of these 
emotions—such as delight, wonder, awe, courage, doubt, tenacity, and 
hope—will be common between the intellectual and the religious sphere; 
others—reverence and contrition perhaps—will be particular to religious 
experience. With this in mind, we can see a striking parallel between 
Newton’s thoughts and feelings, bound up together, directed towards the 
coloured spectrum, and Descartes’ thoughts and feelings directed towards 
God, as he expressed it in the final paragraph of his Third Meditation: “Here 
let me pause for a while and spend some time in the contemplation of God 
. . . and gaze at, wonder at, and adore the beauty of this immense light, so 
far as the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it.”28
Thirdly, as with intellectual activity, we would find that having the ap-
propriate religious virtues would involve having the appropriate emo-
tional dispositions so that one would not be able to act or think virtuously 
without having the right feelings, towards the right objects, at the right 
time, and so on. And without the virtues one would not be able to lead a 
good life; so emotional engagement wouldn’t merely be an optional extra 
but a necessary part of what it is to lead a good religious life.
And fourthly, religious virtues, including the relevant emotional dis-
positions, would be fragile. They would be susceptible to vicissitudes as 
they are elsewhere, or they would remain in place whilst their expression 
is blocked off by depression, apathy, weakness, accidie, sloth, tiredness, 
and so on, so that one’s religious life goes cold on one—both judgement 
and action lack the emotionality that is a requirement of virtue. And then 
we would be faced with the same epistemic questions: what is the expla-
nation of the failure of virtue—the failure to have the right feelings? And 
what would one be able to do about it in any particular case? Answers to 
these questions would not be easy to find. But that is surely to be expected 
once we have given up the simple model of emotion.29
The University of Manchester
28The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes, vol. II, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothof, and 
D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Thanks to John Cottingham 
for this reference. 
29I would like to thank Sarah Coakley for inviting me to give a paper at the conference 
“Faith, Rationality, and the Passions” in Cambridge in January 2010, on which this paper is 
based. Thanks also to The John Templeton Foundation for their support for that conference, 
and to the various excellent contributions from the other participants. Thanks to Thomas 
Flint as editor of this journal, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, and 
to Matthew Ratcliffe. 
